is to examine this purported branding effect and suggest possible refinements to the concept. A more informed evaluation of the prevalence and importance of branding effects awaits further empirical study.
Legal scholars have studied contractual relationships for decades, 8 and articles on "relational contracts" continue to appear regularly in law reviews. 9 The overwhelming majority of legal scholars who write about contractual relationships, however, strive to evaluate or advance contract doctrine. 1 0 Other scholars, taking their cue from the seminal work of Stewart Macaulay, 1 have focused on the management of contractual relationships. The study of contractual relationships could have taken a different path in the legal academy. Instead of focusing on contract doctrine or relationship management, legal scholars could have elected to study contract documents. For the better part of the last three decades, however, such studies have been performed primarily by economists 13 and a smattering of others 14 who work outside of the legal academy. As a result, those who draft and interpret contracts professionally have not contributed substantially to our understanding of contractual structures. 15 Economists often frame the discussion of contract documents around the concept of opportunism, which Oliver Williamson defines as "a condition of self-interest seeking with guile."' 6 Under this view, the potential for opportunism arises because contracting parties are constrained by bounded rationality -the notion that, try as they 13 18 ), the other contracting party can engage in "holdup." 19 Holdup occurs when one contracting party threatens another with economic harm unless concessions are granted by the threatened party. 20 Holdup is, essentially, opportunism realized. The power of holdup exists only within contractual relationships, not in initial contract negotiations, and results from the investment of relationship-specific assets by one of the parties. Anticipation of holdup is said to motivate the structure of contractual relationships. In particular, the potential for holdup encourages contracting parties to enter into long-term relationships or to vertically integrate.
17. Actually, bounded rationality is more complex than being limited in cognitive competence. It might also include an inability to negotiate future plans because parties "have to find a common language to describe states of the world and actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a guide." OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995). Finally, bounded rationality might include an inability to write contracts in such a way that they can be enforced by a third party. Id.
18. WILLIAMSON Victor Fleischer is after something completely different from transaction cost economization.
2 1 The branding effect is not aimed at reducing the potential for opportunism by a counterparty to a contract, but rather at increasing the attractiveness of a product to present and future users, or at improving the image of a company in the eyes of regulators, judges, and juries.
Fleischer's work on the branding effect in contracts fits neatly into a scholarly framework proposed by Mark Suchman, who has argued for a "serious scholarly consideration of contracts as things, that is, for the analysis of contract documents as social artifacts." 22 The purpose of approaching contracts as social artifacts is to reveal more about the contracting parties by invoking a broader set of questions than those normally addressed through transaction cost economics.
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As noted above, Suchman suggests that contracts have both technical and symbolic properties, and Fleischer's "branding effect" may be one of those symbolic properties. 21 . In Brand New Deal, Fleischer describes the objects of his studies as "deal structures." He mentions relational contracts only in passing, Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 6, at 1589, though his description of the deal structures reveals that he is focusing on contractual terms. For example, in his study of the MasterCard IPO, Fleischer examines a "reverse" dual-class voting structure and the creation of a charitable foundation. See Fleischer, supra note 6, at 149-54. Whether all deal structures are "relational" in a Williamsonian sense is a thornier question. Fleischer connects deal structures to transaction cost analysis, see id. at 137 n.1 ("Deal structures are generally driven by a desire to manage transaction costs."), but transaction costs exist in all contracting environments, and some of the deal features cited by Fleischer -for example, Google's use of the "Dutch auction" format for its initial public offering and Ben & Jerry's decision to sell stock only to Vermont residents -are relevant primarily to the sale transaction rather than to the management of the ongoing relationship.
The issue is further muddied by the propensity of law professors to refer to all contracts as relational. . Though I have situated my analysis within the relational contracting literature because I am interested in the study of contract documents, and economic studies focus overwhelmingly on long-term contractual relationships, "branding effects" do not seem uniquely relevant to contracts on the relational end of the relational-discrete continuum.
22. Suchman, supra note 1, at 92. 23. Suchman defines "artifact" as a "discrete material object, consciously produced or transformed by human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or cultural environment." Id. at 98. Artifacts are not speech, gestures, or merely ideas. They are "concrete bits of 'material culture,' and they merit study because of what they reveal about the lives and times of their makers and users." Id.
In his case study of MasterCard, Fleischer examines the branding effect of MasterCard's use of a charitable foundation as a substantial post-IPO shareholder. 24 Fleischer claims that MasterCard has positioned itself as a "financial services company that supports family values and understands the limits of consumerism" 25 and as a brand that consumers associate with safety and security. 26 These messages embedded in MasterCard's brand are aimed at present and future users of MasterCard's services and possibly at regulators, judges, and juries. While branding may play an important role in addressing information asymmetries between a company and its customers, thus reducing the potential for opportunism, 2 7 this signaling function (discussed further below) is distinct from the pure transaction cost economization described above. Under Williamson's framework, transaction cost economization occurs within the contractual relationship, whereas the "branding effect" is a positive externality of that relationship.
The MasterCard foundation would fit neatly into Fleischer's account of a branding effect if the charitable donations were targeted to a cause that fit MasterCard's brand image. In this instance, however, the Foundation exists to support "programs and initiatives that help children and youth access education, understand and utilize technology and develop the skills necessary to succeed in a diverse and global workforce" 28 and "organizations that provide microfinance programs and services to financially disadvantaged persons and communities in order to enhance local economies and develop entrepreneurs." 2 9 According to Fleischer, these causes blur the branding story:
Here, the branding potential is powerful -$600 million is a lot of money to give away -but the fit is unclear. MasterCard's stated purposes related to education and microfinance. The strongest case to be made is that the MasterCard brand image includes access to the upper middle class lifestyle. Education 24. The foundation holds about 17% of the voting shares of MasterCard. This stake represents a claim to 10% of the financial rights in the company and is worth approximately $600 million.
25. Fleischer, supra note 6, at 141. and microfinance are both associated with upward class mobility. By giving money to such causes, MasterCard can enhance its brand image as a facilitator of the Priceless lifestyle. And it may create a few more MasterCard customers to boot. By shackling the foundation's ability to give for four years, however, the brand impact is muted. To the extent the public notices the foundation at all, they may notice it for the corporate governance gimmick that it is rather than the social institution that it may become.
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The weakness of the branding story in this instance raises an obvious question: is it really a branding story at all? The primary obstacle to answering this question is that Fleischer's notion of branding effect needs more development. What follows are some thoughts on how one might refine the theory of branding effects.
First, branding may be a form of signaling, but the branding effect identified by Fleischer also has a function unrelated to signaling, and it is this distinctive function that is most interesting with regard to the future study of contract documents. In the economic literature, contracting parties use signals to mitigate information asymmetries.
3 1 For example, prior to investing in a startup technology company, venture capitalists might want to know whether the company has good management, a culture of innovation, and a viable market niche. Gathering and measuring information to make these analyses may be impossible or, at least, very expensive. As a result, venture capitalists rely on signals, such as patent applications, as external indicators of these positive attributes. 3 2 Patent applications convey some information directly (e.g., the nature of the invention), but the signaling function of patent applications flows from the indirect transmission of information (e.g., regarding firm productivity or innovative activity). Branding may perform a similar function between companies and consumers or investors by conveying information about firm or product quality that would otherwise be difficult to discover, produce, or transmit. Fleischer acknowledges the possibility that a deal structure might serve as a "reputational bonding mechanism," 34 which is a conventional economic term that approximates "branding." 3 5 On the other hand, Fleischer contends that "deal structure is an effective advertising medium when it reaches early adopters and opinion leaders: sophisticated, knowledgeable consumers who start trends." 36 Though Fleischer refers to this form of advertising as "consumer signaling," it is not signaling in the conventional economic sense because it is not aimed at mitigating information asymmetries. 3 7 The possibility that deal structures have a marketing component is the most innovative and intriguing aspect of Fleischer's work. 39. See Bobby J. Calder & Steven J. Reagan, Brand Design, in KELLOGG ON MAR-KETING, supra note 38, at 58 ("To market, we have to go beyond the product. We must transcend whatever the product is as a physical or objective entity. We must create and convey the meaning of the product."). The meaning of a brand is separate from the markers of that brand. Douglas Holt illustrates the distinction as follows:
Consider a new product that a company has just introduced. Although the product has a name, a trademarked logo, unique packaging, and perhaps other unique design features -all aspects that we intuitively think of as the brand -the brand does not yet truly exist. Names, logos, and design are the material markers of the brand. Because the product does not yet have a history, however, these markers are empty. They are devoid of meaning. Now, think of famous brands. They have markers, also: a name (McDonald's, IBM), a logo (the Nike swoosh, the Travelers umbrella), a distinctive design feature (Harley's engine sound), or any other design element that is uniquely associated with the product. The difference is that these markets have been filled references to emotional 40 -or even religious 4 1 -concepts. Brand meanings are created through stories, 4 2 and these stories have many authors. 43 Fleischer adds "deal structures" to the list of stories that contribute to a brand's identity. Second, the "branding effect" is pervasive, just as brands themselves are pervasive. 44 Though Fleischer disclaims the notion that "every deal has important branding implications," 4 5 it is not hard to imagine that many of the deals that fall within Fleischer's contemplation -including "IPOs, mergers and acquisitions, securities offerings, executive-compensation arrangements, and other matters of with customer experiences. Advertisements, films, and sporting events use the brand as a prop. Magazines and newspaper articles evaluate the brand, and people talk about the brand in conversation. Over time, ideas about the product accumulate and fill the brand markers with meaning. A brand is formed. "Stories are shortcuts we use because we're too overwhelmed by data to discover all the details." Id. at 2. Ultimately, however, Godin's message is that stories convey meaning rather than information. See id. at 8 ("A great story is true. Not true because it's factual, but true because it's consistent and authentic."). 43. HOLT, supra note 39, at 3 ("A brand emerges as various 'authors' tell stories that involve the brand. Four primary types of authors are involved: companies, the culture industries, intermediaries (such as critics and retail salespeople), and customers (particularly when they form communities).").
44. Patrick Hanlon defines "brand" as "any product, service, personality, organization, social cause, political ideology, religion, movement, or other entity searching for popular appeal." HANLON, supra note 41, at 6-7. See also Tybout & Carpenter, supra note 38, at 74 ("Brands are one of the most universal aspects of modern markets. Nearly every company, whether or not it competes in consumer markets, has a brand -an identity, a name, a reputation.").
45. See Fleischer, Brand New Deal, supra note 7, at 1586.
Winter 2007] internal corporate governance" 4 6 -contribute to the formation of a brand. As noted above, brands are shaped by stories, and many of these transactions are stories. For example, if using a Dutch auction for its initial public offering marks Google as "innovative, egalitarian, playful, [and] trustworthy," 4 7 using a firm-commitment offering may support the image of another company as staid, traditional, elitist, or sneaky. 48 Third, the branding effect is only one form of symbolic communication used in contracts. Mark Suchman suggests other possibilities.
For example, contracts might be "sacred symbol[s that] . . . link the lived-reality of individual transactions to broader cultural belief systems . . .,,49 Suchman also asserts that some contract structures become "ideograms, representing concepts and postures that the parties cannot or will not explicitly verbalize." 50 Fourth, the branding effect may sometimes coincide with transaction cost stories. For example, one might argue that Google's use of the Dutch auction was an attempt to maximize the proceeds of the IPO, 51 or that MasterCard's use of a charitable foundation was motivated by a combination of regulatory cost engineering and takeover protection, rather than a desire to enhance the MasterCard brand. 52 Of course, if the branding effect and transaction cost stories always coincided, one might question the value of adding branding effects to the analytical arsenal. But the occasional coincidence of transaction cost economization and branding does not diminish the value of understanding Fleischer's branding effect. Indeed, Fleischer's criticism of the MasterCard lawyers implies that a deeper understanding of the branding effect would enhance the value that lawyers bring to transactions.
